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Introduction 
Belgium occupies a distinct position in PISA 2012 scores (see Figure 1). First, the Belgian 
educational system belongs to the international top in terms of performance. The top students in 
Belgium score second highest of all ISCY countries on mathematics. However, Belgian 15-year 
olds are also among the worst performing students on these tests, scoring only slightly better than 
students from France, Iceland, Norway, Spain, and USA. No wonder then, that Belgium has the 
highest level of inequality in achievement of all countries taking part in the ISCY-study, as 
shown by the spread on the PISA results. 
Belgium is a federal country. Since the state reform of 1989, education is a jurisdiction of the 
communities. Belgian has three communities: the Flemish, French and German-speaking 
community. As such, in Belgium, actually three educational systems exist. As Ghent – the 
Belgian city which participates in the International Study of City Youth – is situated in the 
Flemish Community, this paper is only concerned with the Flemish educational system. The 
Flemish PISA results roughly coincide with the results shown in Figure 1, with Flemish students 
having one of the highest spreads in PISA results of all countries participating in ISCY.  
The aim of the current paper is to offer explanations for this peculiar position of Flanders by 
searching for system influences on student performance. First, we will discuss the specificities of 
the Flemish educational system. Thereafter, we will argue that the Flemish tracking system is one 
of the most important reasons for the existence of the large performance gap. 
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Figure 1: The position of Belgium in PISA 2012 mathematics 
 
 
The structure of the Flemish educational system  
One specific feature of the three educational systems in Belgium is the constitutional right of 
freedom, which implies freedom to establish primary or secondary educational institutions. This 
has led to political discussions and impasses in Belgian history, whereby the Catholic party 
firmly opposed any intrusion of this freedom. As a result, there are public and private schools, 
with a large majority of private primary and secondary schools. However, also private schools 
receive conditional funding from the government for personnel and operating costs. These 
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schools are mostly catholic. The funding for private schools is almost always lower than for 
public schools due to divergent allocation formulas. Even though private education has a certain 
pedagogical freedom, it needs to meet the attainment targets of the Flemish Community.  
Compulsory education starts at the age of six with primary education. Nevertheless, 99 percent of 
the children attends at least one year of kindergarten, starting at the age of two-and a half 
(Bekkers, Bennet, Kahiluto, Neuman, & Penn, 2000). Primary education lasts six years and is 
comprehensively organized (see Figure 2). At the age of 12, children make the transition to 
secondary education. Secondary education consists of six years, which are divided in three ‘units’ 
of two grades each. In first and second grade, there is a choice between two streams, called the A 
stream and B stream. The B stream is meant ‘for students who are less suitable for theoretical 
oriented education’ (Flemish Department of Education, 2008). Most pupils enroll in the A 
stream, which has a general curriculum with a broad scope and aims to orient students to the 
different tracks in the third grade. From the third grade on, grades are divided in four main tracks: 
academic, technical, artistic and vocational education. The academic track prepares students for 
higher education. The technical track emphasizes general and practical training. The artistic track 
combines general education with an arts training, but the number of pupils in this track is quite 
low. The vocational track prepares students for a specific vocation. A student who followed the A 
stream in first and second grade can choose one of the four tracks in third grade. Students in the 
B stream can only enter the vocational track, except if they first repeat the initial two grades in 
the A-stream.  
In Flanders, between-school tracking is most common, though within-school tracking exists. 
Thus, many schools offer one or two tracks, giving rise to academic schools, technical/vocational 
schools and a few vocational schools (Van Houtte, Demanet, & Stevens, 2012). Besides these 
categorical schools, multilateral schools offer academic, technical and vocational tracks. 
4 
 
Nonetheless, in multilateral schools groups are not heterogeneous, as these schools are also 
characterized by stringent tracking.  
 
Figure 2: Structure of the Flemish educational system 
 
Although the pupil’s choice of track officially occurs at the age of 14, mostly that decision is 
already made at the age of 12. In first and second grade, there are optional courses, which can be 
grouped into four clusters: classical languages (Latin and Greek), general subjects, technical-
theoretical options, and technical-practical options (Van Damme, De Fraine, Van Landeghem, 
Opdenakker, & Onghena, 2002). These options are supposed to prepare students for particular 
tracks. In addition, these optional courses give shape to homogeneous, fixed class groups in first 
and second grade of secondary education (Boone, 2013). Moreover, not every school offers all 
optional courses, as most only offer those optional courses in accordance with the available tracks 
in second to sixth grade. Hence, the choice for a certain school in first and second grade often 
determines the track from third grade on. 
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At the end of each school year, students receive a certificate which determines the student’s 
options for the next school year based on the evaluation of their performance. The A-certificate 
confirms that a student may proceed to the next grade in the same track. The B-certificate gives a 
student access to the next grade, but only in a different, usually lower track. If a student wants to 
remain in the same track, he/she has to repeat the same grade. A C-certificate obliges grade 
retention, possibly in a lower track. Consequently, the choice of track is not irreversible and 
pupils can switch, but the existence of the B-certificate and C-certificate principally creates a 
flow of students in one direction, namely from the more academic oriented tracks to more 
practical tracks. Therefore, this phenomenon has been called ‘the cascade system’ (Van Praag et. 
al, 2012).  
Compulsory education ends at the age of 18. There is a possibility of part-time vocational 
secondary education at the age of 15, however, only 8867 students were enrolled in this type of 
education in 2012-2013 (Flemish Department of Education, 2013). It is enshrined in the Belgian 
Constitution that every child has the right to education, which ensures education without tuition 
fee during compulsory education. After six years of secondary education, students receive a high 
school diploma, granting unlimited access to higher education (with the exception of medicine, 
which requires an entrance exam). In the vocational track, however, an additional seventh grade 
is needed to obtain a high school diploma. A central exam does not exist, so the decision to award 
a diploma is the responsibility of the school. Educational institutes have a lot of autonomy in 
Flanders (Stevens, 2007). The government ensures high quality in compulsory education through 
attainment targets and development objectives, which are monitored through inspections. A high 
school diploma gives access to higher education, as for most programs in tertiary education the 
only precondition is a high school diploma. Thus, although academic education is intended to 
prepare for higher education, every student with a high school diploma is allowed to enter tertiary 
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education. Nevertheless, the chances to succeed in tertiary education are higher for students that 
completed the academic track (Vanderheyden and Van Trier, 2008).  
Institutes of tertiary education are divided in universities and colleges of higher education. After 
the ratification of the Bologna declaration in 1999, the diplomas of higher education in the 
European Union were unified into bachelors and masters degrees in order to ensure free 
movement between EU member states. In Flanders, there is an additional distinction between an 
academic and professional bachelor degree (Flemish Department of Education, n.d.). A 
professional bachelor provides a direct enrollment into employment and is traditionally offered 
by colleges of higher education. An academic bachelor prepares for a master’s degree and is 
mostly awarded at universities. There is also the possibility for students with a professional 
bachelor to get a master’s degree after completing a supplementary transition year.  
The constitutional right of freedom discussed at the beginning of this section also implies that 
parents may choose the school and track for their children. First, parents can choose the primary 
and secondary school of their children. The allocation of students to schools has not been 
regulated (e.g. by place of residence) and each student has the equal right to enrollment in the 
school chosen by his parents, except for certain priority rules in larger cities. The freedom of 
parental choice has led to socioeconomic and ethnic segregation (see Agirdag, Van Houtte & Van 
Avermaet, 2012). Moreover, the transition from primary to secondary education is not 
characterized by standardized tests or binding recommendations. Therefore, it is the 
responsibility of the parents to select the track of their children at the start of secondary 
education, usually based on the prior achievement in primary school. However, research has 
shown that socio-economic status plays an important role in the choice between different tracks 
(Boone & Van Houtte, 2010). 
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The implications of the track system for equity and excellence in Flanders 
The stringent tracking system is generally said to be responsible for the peculiar position of 
Flanders in the PISA results. Worldwide there has been a long tradition of grouping students in 
secondary education according to their ability level. Ability grouping is the practice of dividing 
students for instruction according to their purported capacities for learning and usually refers to 
the placement of students into homogeneous learning groups (Gamoran et al., 1995). It is applied 
with the expectation that teaching a group of students with similar ability is more efficient. 
Moreover, students are expected to have different kinds of talents, therefore have different 
futures, and thus they need to learn different things (Oakes 1985, 2005). This grouping of ability 
is organized in a myriad ways. For example, ‘tracking’ refers to a situation in which students are 
taught an entirely different curriculum depending on their ability group.  
In spite of these good intentions, tracking seems to have adverse effects for students in certain 
tracks. In our present knowledge society, notwithstanding that there is a profound need for well-
skilled, specific craftspeople, the occupations for which students are prepared in 
technical/vocational tracks are little esteemed. Additionally, technical/vocational students face 
fewer post-educational opportunities, as unemployment rates are higher for those with lower 
educational credentials. All this leads to technical and vocational tracks being undervalued. 
Consequently, tracks are – in the mind of students, parents, and teachers – hierarchically ordered, 
placing academic tracks at the higher end, and technical/vocational tracks at the lower end (Van 
Houtte, 2004; Van Praag et al. 2012). As a result, a technical or vocational training is usually not 
a positive choice, but rather a second choice because one does not meet the standards set by 
academic tracks (Ainsworth & Roscigno 2005; Jellab 2005). This has led to the aforementioned 
“cascade-effect”, in which students start in higher tracks, but when they fail to gain the necessary 
academic credentials, they move to lower – and less valued – tracks (Van Praag et al. 2012). 
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This hierarchical ordering of the different tracks is responsible for the large gap between students 
in the higher tracks and those in the lower tracks. First, due to the cascade system, groups in the 
higher tracks tend to become more and more homogeneous, whereas groups in the lower tracks – 
because of the influx of ‘failed’ students from the higher tracks – tend to become more and more 
heterogeneous in terms of previously followed trajectories (Van Praag et al., 2012). As a result, 
teachers in the technical and vocational tracks have more difficulty in tuning the subject matter to 
all students in class. Especially in more academically oriented courses in technical/vocational 
tracks, there is a high level of heterogeneity in ability. Students following the vocational track 
from the start of secondary education generally have difficulty in mastering these courses, 
whereas students coming from higher tracks often have already seen the subject matter (Van 
Praag et al. 2012).  
Secondly, students ending up in technical/vocational tracks are likely to perceive they have failed 
the educational system. Being enrolled in the lowly valued technical/vocational tracks, students 
develop a sense of futility – which means that students believe that putting effort in studying and 
gaining good grades is pointless (Van Houtte & Stevens 2008). Moreover, from the end of the 
1960s (starting with Hargreaves 1967; Lacey 1970; Rosenbaum 1976) it has been demonstrated 
repeatedly that students in lower tracks develop an anti-school culture to overcome the status 
deprivation resulting from being in a lower track (e.g., Ball 1981; Berends 1995; Catsambis et al. 
1999; Oakes 1985, 2005). This is – amongst other factors – apparent in lower levels of study 
involvement (Van Houtte & Stevens 2009) and higher levels of school misconduct (Van Houtte 
& Stevens 2008) for students attending technical/vocational tracks. The hierarchical ordering of 
the tracks has implications for the teachers as well. Many teachers in the lower tracks are not 
confident that students will meet their expectations with respect to educational performance (Van 
Houtte, 2004, 2006). The lower levels of trust that teachers have of their students attending 
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technical/vocational schools lead to lower levels of sense of belonging (Van Houtte & Van Maele 
2012). Moreover, it has been shown that low teacher expectations give rise to higher rates of 
school misconduct (Demanet & Van Houtte, 2012). As such, teacher attitudes in 
technical/vocational schools may contribute to the anti-school culture manifested in these 
students. 
Moreover, the tendency of the Flemish tracking system to increase the educational gap between 
high and low achievers is responsible for creating an achievement gap between students from the 
higher and lower social strata. Research showed, namely, that students’ allocation within the 
various tracks is not only dependent upon academic credentials, it is also affected by social 
background. More specifically, students from a higher socio-economic background are not only 
more likely to choose for the A-stream in lower secondary education, they also more often opt for 
theoretical courses in that A-stream, for example by choosing Latin (Boone & Van Houtte, 
2013a). This observation may – in part – be explained by biased teacher recommendations: 
teachers are more likely to recommend a more theoretical curriculum for students of higher 
socio-economic backgrounds (Boone & Van Houtte, 2013b). Eventually, these students are more 
likely to end up in the higher tracks than their equally-performing counterparts from lower social 
strata. However, this role of the teacher may only partly explain social differences in track 
allocation, as the decision whether to follow these recommendations lies with the parents. In line 
with the idea of relative risk aversion (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997), parents want their children to 
be at least as successful as themselves. Therefore, parents from the higher social strata more 
readily limit the choices of their children to following the academic track, while parents from 
lower social strata allow for more choice options (Boone & Van Houtte, 2013a). As such, for a 
child from a more disadvantaged background, it may suffice to follow technical or vocational 
education in order to attain the education level of their parents. For students from more affluent 
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families, only the academic track suffices for that end. Moreover, due to a lack of valid 
information about the secondary educational system, many ethnic minority students actually 
aiming for higher education end up in the technical or vocational track (Van Praag et al. 2012). 
This seriously jeopardizes their postsecondary opportunities, a fact that these students eventually 
become aware of, when it is already too late to change tracks. 
In summary, the strict tracking system in Flanders has given rise to a highly stratified and 
hierarchically ordered system. The students that perform excellently on PISA tests are enrolled in 
academic tracks – clearly, this system is well-suited to ensure educational growth in students. In 
Flanders, though, this comes at a large price. The hierarchical ordering of the various tracks leads 
to the perception among the many students in the lower tracks that they have failed the 
educational system, giving rise to an anti-school culture that jeopardizes future educational 
success. As selection into the various tracks is codependent upon social background factors, the 
Flemish tracking system eventually exacerbates social inequality in opportunities. No wonder, 
then, that, while Flanders scores high on excellence in PISA tests, it also tends to score low on 
equity. 
 
The current study 
To demonstrate the effects of the Flemish track system, we will present some results of the 
International Study of City Youth data on Ghent. First, we will consider the role of social 
background characteristics in track allocation. Second, we will investigate differential attitudes 
and behaviors across the tracks of the Flemish educational system. More specifically, we will 
investigate students’ sense of futility - which concerns students’ attitudes about whether putting 
effort in studying and gaining good grades is pointless -, and the level of school misconduct – 
which is minor rule-breaking behavior at school. Moreover, as students with antischool attitudes 
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are likely to value part-time working as a way to demonstrate their adulthood (Willis 1977), we 
also investigate differences between tracks with regard to part-time working. 
 
Methodology 
Sample 
We use data from the International Study of City Youth (ISCY), a longitudinal cross-national 
study in Ghent and 11 other cities (Barcelona, Bergen, Bordeaux, Hong Kong, Melbourne, 
Montreal, Reykjavik, Sacramento, Santa Barbara, Turku, and Wroclaw). The study tracks one 
cohort of students in 2013-2014 in the modal grade for 15-year olds – e.g. the 10th grade in the 
US, the 4th grade of secondary school in Flanders – in each city over five years. Hence, the ISCY 
study charts cross-national differences in educational pathways through the microcosm of cities 
in different countries.  
For the current study, we use the data of the baseline survey for Ghent, which was collected in 
2013-2014. The general approach was to use a two-stage stratified cluster design. First, schools 
were sampled, in which then a sample of students in the appropriate grade was selected. The 
selected students filled out an online questionnaire in class. Additionally, all teachers of the 
appropriate grades and the principals were surveyed by online questionnaires. In each large city, 
4,000 students across 30 schools were targeted.  
In Ghent – as in the other smaller cities (Wroclaw, and Turku) – we took a census approach. We 
contacted all 39 secondary schools that offered a 4th secondary school grade in Ghent. Of these, 
30 agreed to take part in the study (response rate: 76.92%). In the participating schools, we asked 
all fourth grade students present at the time of the visit to fill out the questionnaire. Students 
filled out the questionnaire in class, supervised by members of the research team and a teacher. A 
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few students were not present, due to absence or field trips. A total of 2354 students provided 
valid surveys, which amounts to a response rate of 90.25%. 
 
Measures 
Students provided us with the track they attended. Of the respondents, 55.20% followed the 
academic track, 17.5% attended the technical track, 7.1% enrolled in the arts track, and 19.1% 
attended the vocational track.  
First, to show the role of social background factors in track allocation in Flanders, we compare 
the Socio-Economic Status (SES) of students between the four tracks. We should note that 
advanced socio-economic measures are not yet available for the ISCY survey, so we necessarily 
limit ourselves to some rudimentary measures. First, we asked the students to what extent they 
agreed with the following statement ‘My parents often do not have enough money to make ends 
meet’. Students could answer on a five-point scale, ranging from absolutely disagree to 
absolutely agree (1-5). The mean for the entire sample was 1.75 (SD=0.772). A second measure 
for SES consists of indicators whether they had a desk at home to study at, a quiet place to study, 
a computer that they can use for schoolwork, a link to the internet, a piano, or other musical 
instruments (coding: yes=1). The final scale was arrived at by summing answers over all these 
items. The mean in the sample was 4.59 (SD=0.986). 
To denote the impact of the tracking system on students’ attitudes and behaviors, we consider 
three outcomes. First, the attitudinal outcome is provided by the sense of futility scale (see 
Brookover et al. 1975), which denotes students’ mastery concerning educational goals. Examples 
of items are: “People like me will not have much of a chance to do what we want to in life” and 
“At school, students like me don’t have any luck”. Students had five possible answers, ranging 
from absolutely disagree to absolutely agree (1–5). The answers across these items were 
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summed, yielding a range of 5 through 25 (Cronbach’s alpha=0.74). The mean in the sample was 
11.77 (SD=2.64). The behavioral measure is operationalized by the school misconduct scale (see 
Stewart 2003). Students were asked how often they performed deviant acts such as being late for 
school, cheating on tests and doing drugs during school hours. They could answer using a 5-point 
scale, ranging from never (1) to very often (5). Scores were summed to a scale (Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.85) ranging from 17 to 65 (mean=29.70, SD=7.73). Last, we also considered whether 
students worked part-time. Of all respondents, 14.2% indicated that they had a part-time job at 
the moment of the survey administration. However, we should note that students having part-time 
jobs were still fully enrolled at school, combining their part-time jobs with a full-time education. 
 
Data analyses  
To determine whether there are significant differences between the tracks on the socio-economic 
situation of students, and on the attitudinal and behavioral variables, we performed one-way 
analyses of variance (ANOVA). Subsequently, we performed post-hoc tests to examine the 
between-group differences in more detail. For this, we used the Bonferonni procedure. 
Moreover, to rule out spurious relations and selection effects, we investigated the role of tracks in 
the attitudinal and behavioral measures in multivariate regression analyses, in which we 
controlled for gender, age, and indicators of SES. The tracks were entered by means of dummy 
variables, with the academic track as the reference category. The findings on sense of futility and 
school misconduct are based on linear regression analyses, the findings on part-time working are 
based on logistic regression analyses, as this concerned a dichotomous variable (1=part-time job). 
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Results 
Social background factors 
The ANOVA results showed differences between tracks on parental financial difficulty 
(F=41.532; p<0.001). Students in the academic track indicated least financial difficulties for their 
parents (M=1.61). Students in the technical track reported more financial difficulties (M=1.77) 
than those in the academic track and less than those in the artistic (M=2.05) and vocational track 
(M=2.02). All these difference were statistically significant (p<.001). The difference between the 
artistic and the technical track was not significant (p>.05).  
 
Figure 3: Association between tracks and financial difficulties. Results of one-way ANOVA 
 
 
Roughly the same picture arose for the measure of SES (see Figure 4). The ANOVA results show 
that this differed significantly across tracks (F=113.431; p<.001). Students form the academic 
track had the highest level of SES (M=4.87). However, students from the artistic track had high 
levels of SES as well (M=4.69), and the difference between these two tracks was not significant 
(p>.05). Students from the technical track had lower levels of SES (M=4.36), and vocational 
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students had the lowest level of SES (M=3.94). All differences between tracks – except for the 
difference between the academic and the artistic track, were significant (p<.001).  
 
Figure 4: Association between track and SES. Results of one-way ANOVA 
 
As such, these data confirm the differences in social background between the tracks: students in 
the academic track were the most advantaged, students in the vocational track the least, while the 
technical track occupied a position in the middle. The artistic track was more difficult to place in 
this hierarchy: students indicated that their parents have many financial difficulties, but they were 
high in with respect to the indicators of SES. 
 
Attitudes and behavior 
In this section we compare students’ attitudes and behaviors across the tracks in Flanders. We 
start with students’ sense of futility. The ANOVA results show that this attitudinal measure 
differs significantly between tracks (F=31.374; p<.001; see Figure 5). Students enrolled in the 
academic track had the lowest mean (M=11.34), but they did not differ significantly (p>.05) from 
students in the artistic track (M=11.82). Students in the vocational track had the highest levels of 
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futility (M=12.68), and the technical students again occupied the middle position (M=12.108). 
These findings are also apparent from the multivariate regression analyses (see Table 1). 
Moreover, net of their high level of SES, students in the artistic track were also more likely than 
the academic students to feel futile. We may conclude from these analyses on futility that 
students in the lower tracks are significantly more likely to perceive that the school system is 
stacked against them in comparison to their counterparts in the higher tracks. 
 
Figure 5: Association between track and sense of futility. Results of one-way ANOVA 
 
The image is somewhat different for school misconduct. First, the ANOVA results indicate 
significant differences between the tracks (F=6.772; p<0.001). However, while the means follow 
the pattern as predicted (see Figure 6), the bonferroni post-hoc analyses showed that only the 
vocational track differed significantly from the academic and technical tracks, as all other 
differences were not significant. This image is also apparent from the multivariate regression 
analyses (see Table 2). As such, the manifest opposition of the school by rule-breaking behavior 
is only present in the vocational track. 
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Table 1: Association between track and sense of futility. Results of multivariate linear 
regression analyses 
Intercept   b 12.244*** 
  
SE 0.951 
Gender 
 
b -0.403*** 
  
SE 0.112 
Age 
 
b 0.052 
  
SE 0.058 
SES 
 
b -0.218*** 
  
SE 0.06 
Track  
(ref cat: 
academic track) 
  
 
 
Arts track b 0.447* 
  
SE 0.226 
 
Technical 
track b 
0.551*** 
  
SE 0.157 
 
Vocational 
track b 
1.040*** 
    SE 0.171 
Note: The unstandardized coefficients (b) are presented, with the standard errors (SE). * p ≤ .05, ** 
p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
 
Figure 6: Association between track and school misconduct. Results of one-way ANOVA 
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Table 2: Association between track and school misconduct. Results of multivariate linear 
regression analyses 
Intercept   b 29.070*** 
  
SE 2.861 
Gender 
 
b -1.564*** 
  
SE 0.339 
Age 
 
b 0.224 
  
SE 0.174 
SES 
 
b -0.152 
  
SE 0.183 
Track  
(ref cat: 
academic track) 
  
 
 
Arts track b 1.309 
  
SE 0.684 
 
Technical 
track b 
-0.088 
  
SE 0.473 
 
Vocational 
track b 
1.332** 
    SE 0.514 
Note: The unstandardized coefficients (b) are presented, with the standard errors (SE). * p ≤ .05, ** 
p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
 
Figure 7: Percentage of students having a part-time job: differences between tracks.  
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Table 3: Association between track and part-time working. Results of multivariate logistic 
regression analyses 
Intercept   b -6.909*** 
  
OR 0.001*** 
  
SE 1.196 
Gender 
 
b 0.452*** 
  
OR 1.571*** 
  
SE 0.135 
Age 
 
b 0.264*** 
  
OR 1.302*** 
  
SE 0.073 
SES 
 
b -0.003 
  
OR 0.997 
  
SE 0.069 
Track  
(ref cat: 
academic track) 
  
 
 
Arts track b 0.233 
  
OR 1.263 
  
SE 0.264 
 
Technical 
track b 
0.494** 
  
OR 1.639** 
  
SE 0.18 
 
Vocational 
track b 
0.654*** 
  
OR 1.924*** 
    SE 0.187 
Note: The unstandardized coefficients (b) and odds ratio’s (OR) are presented,  
with the standard errors (SE). * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
 
Last, we considered differences between tracks in whether students had part-time jobs besides 
their full-time enrollment at school. The percentages by track are shown in figure 7. Only about 
10% of students from the academic track had a part-time job, which was less than half of the 
percentage in the vocational track (23%). The artistic track (14%) and the technical track (18%) 
fell in between these extremes. The multivariate analyses (see Table 3) showed that the difference 
between the academic and artistic tracks was not significant, but the other differences were. As 
such, students were more likely to have a part-time job when attending the technical or vocational 
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track. This might be, as explained above, a way for students experiencing status deprivation at 
school to prove their adulthood as an alternative way of gaining status. 
 
Discussion 
Flanders occupies a peculiar position in PISA scores. While the system scores high on 
excellence, it tends to score low on equity as there is a high gap between the highest and lowest 
performing students. The aim of this paper was to explain this distinct position by pointing to the 
specifics of the tracking system in secondary education. 
We argued that the strict tracking system in Flanders has given rise to a highly stratified and 
hierarchically ordered system. The wide spread on PISA scores is due to the fact that students in 
the academic track are taught in relatively homogeneous class settings, which ensures high levels 
of educational growth in students. Due to the hierarchical nature of the system, however, students 
in lower tracks are characterized by an antischool culture. This assertion was supported by the 
empirical analyses shown in the current study, as students in the lower tracks – most notably 
those in the vocational track – are more likely to believe that putting effort in school-related tasks 
is pointless. Moreover, they are more likely to act out against the system by posing rule-breaking 
behavior at school. Finally, they are also overrepresented among the students with part-time jobs 
– which might be an alternative way of gaining status (see Willis 1977). The specific 
organization of tracking in Flemish education therefore seems directly responsible for widening 
the achievement gap. Moreover, track allocation is not only based on academic credentials, as 
students from lower socio-economic backgrounds are more likely to end up in the technical or 
vocational track – net of achievement. This was supported by the findings of the current study 
that disclosed differences between tracks in the socio-economic status of students’ families. 
Hence, the tracking system not only creates an achievement gap, it generates social inequality – a 
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finding which is supported by cross-national research (Gamoran, 2010; Van der Werfhorst & 
Mijs, 2010). 
One might argue that the differences in attitudes between tracks seem not that large. However, 
previous Flemish research has pointed to the existence of student cultures – that is, attitudes 
shared by students belonging to the same school or track (Van Houtte, 2006; Van Houtte & 
Stevens, 2008). Hence, differences in attitudes between tracks may give rise to track-specific 
student cultures, which might impact on all students in those tracks, irrespective of their proper 
attitudes. This is important as students are socialized into the student culture at school – in other 
words, students tend to comply to the overall student culture of a school.  
Moreover, while differences between attitudes and behaviors may be small, they are very real in 
their consequences. Previous research has demonstrated the importance of sense of futility 
(Agirdag et al. 2012) and school misconduct (Jimerson & Ferguson, 2007; Roeser & Eccles 
1998) for students’ achievement and chances to be retained in their current grade. As such, these 
differential attitudes and behaviors may contribute to a widening achievement gap between 
tracks. 
While tracking has a long-standing tradition in Flanders, being applied since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, we should note that, recently, policy makers have begun to question the way 
Flemish secondary education is organized. Although a secondary education revolution is not yet 
ready to be realized in Flanders (see e.g. Nicaise et al. 2014), it seems at least that the hierarchical 
nature of the tracking system is ready to be challenged by policy makers in Flanders. This might 
be the first step in bringing equity in the Flemish system to the same level as its excellence. 
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